Anthony Wier is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Policy in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. He speaks on U.S.’s efforts to ensure a safer world. Excerpts:
Biden and Sunak
On Monday, of course as you know, President Biden, UK Prime Minister Sunak, and Australian Prime Minister Albanese, after an 18 month consultation period, announced the optimal pathway for Australia to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines, or SSNs, under the Australia-UK-United States partnership also known as AUKUS.
So as you know, AUKUS comprises two pillars: the first pillar, which we’re here to focus on today – under that first pillar, we in the United States along with the United Kingdom and – are assisting Australia in acquiring conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines while setting the highest nonproliferation standard possible. Under the second pillar, we will jointly collaborate with the – among the three partners to develop a series of advanced technologies, including undersea capabilities, quantum computing, and in other – a number of other things.
I think it’s important at the outset to note that naval nuclear propulsion does not mean nuclear weapons. Naval nuclear propulsion means that the submarines are powered by nuclear reactors. That’s it. This technology is safe. For over 60 years, the United States and the United Kingdom have traveled over 240 million kilometers. That’s the equivalent of over 300 trips to the Moon and back without adverse effect on human health or the quality of the environment.
The essence of AUKUS
AUKUS is a defense partnership, but it’s about more than that. It is a concrete commitment of the United States and our partners and our allies to a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific by bringing together our sailors, our scientists, and our industries to maintain and expand our collective capacity to maintain peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.
We support Australia’s decision to modernize its submarine fleet, obviously, but moreover, through AUKUS, the United States, Australia, and the UK intend to significantly deepen our longstanding cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities. And in doing so, we are actively working to re-examine and streamline our processes for optimizing defense trade through any AUKUS context.
I think it’s important to make clear: Australia is a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and has made clear it does not and will not seek nuclear weapons. The longstanding and demonstrated commitment to nuclear nonproliferation by Australia has been essential to making this partnership possible. And all three partners remain compliant with and committed to maintaining their respective legal obligations and to nonproliferation.
To that end, this initiative will occur within the framework of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Our nations, from the very beginning 18 months ago, have consulted regularly with the IAEA in support of the IAEA’s mandate to uphold the integrity of the global nuclear safeguards regime. As you are probably aware, the director general of the IAEA has in the past reported to IAEA member-states that AUKUS partners are committed to ensuring the highest nonproliferation and safeguard standards are met, and he has in the past noted his satisfaction with the engagement and transparency shown by the three countries to that point. We’re – the international community can be confident, in our view, that our three nations will continue to work transparently with the IAEA towards an approach that will strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and set a strong nonproliferation precedent.
Cooperation
So cooperation on nuclear reactors, technology, and the like is governed under U.S. law by something called the Atomic Energy Act. Both the Department of Energy and the Department of State, as well as the Department of Defense in this case, have responsibilities under that act.
As you may recall at the outset of the AUKUS initiative, one of the requirements was for the three countries to secure agreement among themselves for the transfer of information – just information only related to naval propulsion – and that was completed through a trilateral agreement that was submitted through our various constitutional mechanisms, including in the case of the Congress, which has a review mechanism that happened that was completed early on in 2021-2022. It was actually when the agreement was enacted and enabled some of the cooperation that’s already begun.
And then – and a similar type of arrangement will be needed ultimately for – to enable the transfer of the actual reactors and equipment themselves. We have been in close consultations with Congress from the beginning, going back to September of 2021 and working with them closely on how to implement it and are quite confident that we can obtain the necessary pathway to enabling the agreement.
Transparency
We have been committed from the beginning, from September of 2021, to being open and transparent with the international community and with partners, certainly with IAEA member-states, about the approach. We’ve been committed to an approach that enables the IAEA as under its mandate with respect to safeguards to ensure that it has – will have the information so that it can meet the technical objectives that it sits under.
And so we certainly can understand the questions. We’ve been endeavoring at every opportunity to explain the way forward we see. We’ve tried to engage transparently throughout the process, but certainly will continue to do so I think to really highlight our view that the way forward can set a strong precedent for this activity and can contribute to strengthening the IAEA and the broader nonproliferation regime.
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